Abstract

The current declaration, by some of Cardinal Pell's supporters, of his innocence is unreasonable and wrong. The samemay be said of those who proonounce him as finally guilty, despite his appeal.

Article

The number of rash claims or insinuations that Cardinal Pell is innocent is disturbing, though it is plain that they largely originate from catholic interests or far right wing political supporters. If they were not present for the whole of the trial, their criticism or insinuation of fault against the verdict is disiingenuous and dishonest. In the case of any who were present, the interest which led to their presence may have affected their perception. The bias alleged to be in the eyes of the jury may well be, albeit honetly held, in the eye of the critic.

Criticisms should themselves be subject to fair self-critical revealed scrutiny, which does not appear to have tken place.  Its absence is somewhat indicative.

As I did not attend the trial to hear the evidence, the addresses and summing-up, I do not know that he is guilty, just as they do not know that he is innocent. We know only that he was represented by a leading silk in the criminal jurisdiction, there was direct evidence of his guilt which the jury obviously believed, Pell did not give evidence denying it nor did he submit himself to testing as the prosecution witnesses had done, the summing-up was careful and warned against prejudice and contamination by media interest, and the jury, who heard it all, convicted him beyond reasonable doubt, which is a very high hurdle, as the jury would surely have been told by the trial judge as well as by defence counsel.

It must be remembered that if he were acquitted in law, it is still possible that he was guilty in fact.  An acquittal means only that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Were he acquitted, these people would certainly falsely claim that he was found to be innocent.

The presumption of innocence is a concept that is abused in discussiion. It is intended to be a legal principle as to the approach to be taken by a jury in a criminal trial, reflecting the rule that the onus of proof lies on the prosecution. Otherwise, thereis no presumption either way, and the approach may follow the direction of the evidence.

It must be acknowledged that the intense media cover was undesirable for the fairness of the trial, but I do not recall any media suggestion that he was guilty, or revealing any prejudicial inadmissible material. Claims of prejudice on this count should be scrutinised carefully in order to see whether any of the media coverage was indeed prejudicial. General emotive statements without substance are far from unknown in issues like this. Further, the media also presented statements made by the defence or its supporters.

There is much to be said for strict control of media cover which publishes matters which may, or are even designed to, affect the trial. This view is offended by both the police and the defence sides generally.

On the issue of prejudice, it appeaars that othere was a unanimous verdict of guilty.  This must throw some doubt on any suggestion of a prejudiced result.

It should be acknowledged that mere accusations should not necessarily be accepted as true.  There may be various reasons why they are falsely made - false memory, anger at Pell's attitude to and conduct towards the behaviour of other priests, a desire for personal aggrandisement in the eyes of victims, and even a malicious motive are the most obvious. Presumably, these would have been brought to the jury's attention according to the judgment of defence counse as to their persuasivenessl.

It should also be acknowledged that long delay in complaints make refutation more difficult.  But itwoould be grossly wrong to suggest that it predicates dishonesty in the accuser. Shame is a powerful disincentive, as is the fear of disbelief in the competition of credulity. Any critic who uses this ground but does not acknowledge these factors as well has no credibility.

It would also be unfair to the complainant to withhold allowance for the passage of time in being critical of detail in his account, particularly having regard to the mental state of a child in the alleged situation.

Another important feature is the practicality or otherwise of the alleged very unusual circumstances. Of course, it was clearly open to the highly experienced defence counsel to employ this issue so far as he felt it useful. Any suggestion of hypothetical impossibility of the event may be judged by its exploration of ways in which Pell could have overcome difficulties, such as sending any accompanying persons away on a pretext.

It would indeed be unfortunate if criticisms are now made on the basis of alleged facts or circumstances suggesting improbability which were not presented at the trial.  It might be expected that defence counsel was aware of them and discounted their validity. Further, their absence from evidence would mean that they were not tested, and that the prosecution did not have the opportunity to lead competing evidence or address the point in argument

The want of corroboration is an important issue, and a serious matter to be taken iinto consideration by the jury. Presumably, it was heavily ventilated in argument before the jury. But it is not critical.  A wrongdoer in these circumstances does not usually commit the offence in public, and the vulnerability of a child and the passage of time may also affect the availability of corroboration. Further, while Pell was not obliged to give evidence in defence, and no inference of guilt could be drawn from his silence, that does not affect the result that the complainant's swworn evidence of the offences, tested by the defence, was not denied on oath by Pell.  It was not a case of the word of one against the word of the other.

A failure to acknowledge all these factors must throw doubt on the balance of any commentary on the matter. None of the factors isput forward here as right except insofar as they go to the value of the commentaries.

The claims of Pell's innocence clearly impliedly say that the evidence was false, though it was severely tested by highly competent counsel and not denied by Pell, and that the jury was prejudiced in its verdict, despite the judicial warning and their natural desire to do justice.  These suggestions are disgraceful and manifest the unfortunate state of mind of those who make them.

It would be permissible and propoper to say that the appeal process should be respected and that no final conclusion should be expressed until it is over, which only emphasises the venality of those who, not even having heard the trial in full, have declared his innocence now, with all the assumptions and aggressive implications that they imply. If Pell loses his appeal, their next target will be the validity of the criminal justice system, which would not be seemly, having regard to the way in which it was obstructed at the expense of the childreen who were abused as the result of the obstruction.

This explanation does not in any way imply that Pell is guilty: that is yet to be concluded.  The issue is the behaviour of those who despite the above features, declare that he is falsely convicted. 

The same reasoning applies to those who prematurely assert or assume that he is guilty, such as his hardened detractors or the irresponsible sections of the media.  He is surely entitled to the common benefit of an appeal, and until that, and any possible re-trial, is decided, it is mischievous to speak in terms of a concluded result. 

Those who publicly express a view in either direction should be requuired to write an honest criticism of their own assertions.  Their intellectual integrity will be revealed by the quality of their critiques.  Then the question may be asked why any reasonable counter-argument did nnot appear in their first offeerings.

It wold be a terrible thing if Pell, or any person, were wrongly convicted of such a dreadful offence.  It would also be terrible if he were wrongly acquitted.